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After nine long and anxious months, India and China have agreed on a disengagement plan, marking the successful defusion of the standoff at the Pangong Tso Lake in the Ladakh region. As per the Chinese Ministry of Defence, Indian and Chinese troops have begun a "synchronised and organised disengagement".
The territorial status of Eastern Ladakh (also known as Aksai Chin) has been in limbo for decades. The 1950s were a defining moment, when the battle-lines were clearly made visible in the dispute; India began including Aksai Chin in official maps in 1954, while the Chinese (unbeknownst to India at the time) constructed a road traversing the entire region, connecting the Chinese provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet. Tensions rose between the two nations, following India’s discovery of this construction in 1957, and this issue became one of the triggers for the 1962 Sino-Indian war. Since India’s military defeat in 1962, Aksai Chin has been in Chinese hands, while India continued to claim the region as its own. The Line of Actual Control (LAC) has operated as the de facto border between the two. Ironically however, despite its function as a ceasefire line of sorts, the position of the LAC itself is a matter of contention between the two sides. The ambiguity and mutual distrust surrounding the status of the LAC is what has historically led to several standoffs between the militaries of both sides - just like that in the Galwan Valley in June 2020.
The standoff in Eastern Ladakh began after a violent skirmish between Indian and Chinese forces in the Galwan Valley, leading to the deaths of personnel on both sides. Personnel of China’s PLA (People’s Liberation Army) at the LAC objected to the construction of a road by India, which escalated into a melee clash between both sides. While India reported 20 fatal casualties, unofficial sources claim China suffered over 40 deaths.
This incident resulted in a mass escalation, with heavy troop deployments and infrastructure construction on both sides. Several rounds of military and diplomatic talks were held, all to no avail, and it appeared the standoff had no end in sight. The situation was further exacerbated when PLA troops were said to have infiltrated the LAC into territory held by India.
However, on 24th January 2021, in the ninth round of Corps Commander-level talks, the two sides established a consensus on facilitating mutual disengagement in the region. As per a press release of the Indian Ministry of Defence, the "two sides agreed to push for an early disengagement of frontline troops…and hold the 10th round of the Corps Commander Level Meeting at an early date to jointly advance de-escalation." This proposal for phased disengagement was also discussed at the Foreign and Defence Minister-levels several times in 2020.
As a result of this consensus, the recent disengagement plan emerged. So what exactly does this plan entail?
Firstly, on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso, the Chinese have withdrawn East of Finger 8 (see map above), while the Indians have withdrawn to Finger 3. Thus, the area between Fingers 3 and 8 is effectively a no-man's-land for now. Also, both sides' armoured units have begun a withdrawal from the lake's southern bank. As per Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh: "both sides will cease their forward deployments in a phased, coordinated and verified manner". The Chinese commenced a rapid withdrawal in accordance with the agreement; they withdrew over 200 tanks by 11th February.
Furthermore, both sides have agreed to remove all structures erected by them on the North and South banks of the lake, and have also agreed on temporarily suspending military activities in the area. These measures are a large step towards restoring the status quo ante that existed prior to April 2020, something India was consistently pushing for in negotiations.
Thus, the standoff at the Pangong Tso has been resolved to a great extent. In the meantime, other areas of friction exist in the region, where standoffs have occurred. These include the Galwan Valley, Hot Springs, Gogra Post, and the Depsang Plains. According to Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, both sides will be engaging in talks to resolve the standoffs at these friction points as well, for a phased disengagement.
In a statement, Rajnath Singh mentioned the core principles followed by the Indian side in negotiations with their Chinese counterparts: "(i) both sides should strictly respect and observe the LAC; (ii) neither side should attempt to alter the status quo unilaterally; and (iii) all agreements and understandings between the two sides must be fully abided in their entirety."
What can be understood from this radical thaw in the Sino-Indian standoff?
Firstly, most observers are unanimous in their analysis that India's hard stance against the Chinese has paid dividends. Its earlier decision to ban over a hundred Chinese apps was a significant move in economic and soft power domains, a blow further hardened by India's exclusion of the Chinese company Huawei from its telecommunications sector. However, the most significant of these moves was the Indian decision to stand their ground at the LAC, continue with infrastructure development, and increase troop deployment in concurrence with the growing Chinese presence. Given India's history with China, this undoubtedly indicates a radical shift in India's military policy, and is in line with its modus operandi during the Doklam Standoff of 2017.
It is evident that the present Indian administration under Narendra Modi does not tolerate foreign transgressions into Indian territory (as perceived by India), and follows an inflexible and uncompromising approach in its negotiations regarding the same. Against an adversary like China, which is by nature a revisionist power (i.e., a state that seeks to continually 'revise' the status quo), India has resolved to taking an aggressive and strong-willed approach. The Indian decision to hold out and stand its ground at the LAC, while attempting to outmanoeuvre the Chinese forces, led to the standoff extending throughout the winters in Ladakh, which are inhospitable to humans. Indian troops had a particular advantage in stretching the impasse through the winters, given their decades of combat experience in the Himalayas and the Siachen Glacier: the "highest battleground in the world."
China has serious strategic considerations to take into account. It seeks to reinforce its territorial claim to Aksai Chin (Eastern Ladakh) as a part of the Xinjiang province, and by doing so, secure the land bridge connecting Xinjiang and Tibet. The Xinjiang-Tibet highway which passes through Aksai Chin is essential for China to consolidate its control over both the provinces, which have had historically secessionist tendencies. Chinese efforts to push the Line of Actual Control further west are with the objective of achieving strategic depth in the region, to develop their infrastructure without the looming threat of the Indian forces.
Both sides have had a historic paranoia of each other: India’s fears dating back to the 1962 war, and China’s back to the 1950s over the Tibet issue. Increasing Indian infrastructure development in the region is likely to have fuelled Chinese fears over Indian designs in the region, especially given the aggressive foreign policy of the Modi government. This is evident from the Galwan Valley clash, which was initially triggered by Chinese soldiers objecting to Indian road construction in the area.
Faced with a deadlock with no end in sight, along with mounting costs and casualties, it was in the Chinese interest to cave to Indian demands and accept a mutual phased withdrawal of forces, while India will no doubt rejoice the withdrawal of the Chinese from what India considers to be its own territory. While the standoff was likely triggered by Chinese apprehensions about increasing infrastructure development on the Indian side of the LAC, China may now have to contend with an adversary equally well-entrenched and fortified in Ladakh. While the Chinese have built the Xinjiang-Tibet highway, along with permanent defence structures and settlements, India has responded with infrastructure projects like the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road (DSDBO Road) and the Atal Tunnel. With this successful disengagement, the Indian side will no doubt continue the fortification of its side of Ladakh to place Indian forces at an equal footing to their Chinese counterparts.
A short-term defusion of hostilities, will this signal the start of an overall peace process between the two Asian giants, or will this go down in the long list of close-calls and near-misses from war, only to sow further distrust?
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