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The European football’s (UEFA) governing body recently reversed its decision to remove the slogan “Glory to the heroes” from the Ukrainian national football team jersey. In its decision UEFA noted, “on its own [it] may be considered as a generic and non-political phrase of general national significance.” This backtracks the governing body’s initial stance of the slogan bearing too political of nature, as it was frequently used in Ukraine’s 2014 protest against Russia.
A similar controversy occurred with the depiction of Crimea as a part of Ukraine on the same jersey, with UEFA overturning its previous statement condemning such depictions by citing a UN resolution that recognized Crimea as a legal part of Ukraine.
To understand UEFA’s conflicting stance in this symbolic war between Ukraine and Russia, it is important to understand the origins of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict and how questions of national identity can lead to conflict and irreparable damage.
This started when President Viktor Yanukovych, the former president of Ukraine, refused to sign an association agreement with the European Union, which would have allowed Ukraine to import and export from Europe at a significantly lower cost than with Russia or any non-EU member state. The context here is that the Ukrainian economy grew zero percent during the 2013 fiscal year and declined 1.3 to 2.5 percent during the 2012 fiscal year. The association agreement would have lent Ukraine 500 million Euros needed to invest in its agriculture industry, generating 17.8 billion in exports and steel industry, which makes up roughly 30 percent of Ukraine's economy. In exchange, Ukraine would need to meet EU standards on democracy, human rights, corruption, and transparency. In short, this would have allowed Ukraine to possess the benefits of being an EU member while not being an actual member of the EU.
President Viktor Yanukovych swiftly rejected the deal, claiming it would cost “$500 billion in trade with Russia” along with implementing EU standards which “would cost another $104 billion.” The risks presented by other public and private pressure from Russia such as removing Ukraine’s preferential treatment with oil and gas prices, blocking goods at the Russian-Ukraine border, and implementing higher tariffs also contributed to his decision. The threats were tangible, Russia contributed to 25.7% of Ukrainian exports, compared to the EU’s 24.9%. Russia also provides 32.4% of Ukrainian imports as compared to the EU’s 31%.
Meanwhile, concerns about adequate investment and a foreign debt of $10.5 billion were not, in Yanukovych’s opinion, properly addressed.
In terms of investment, Yanukovych wanted to receive €160 billion while the EU only offered €610 million. Furthermore, the EU’s demand to release Tymoshenko, a political opposition leader to Yanukovych who was politically imprisoned, was problematic to Yanukovych.
In light of these concerns, Yanukovych chose to accept Russia’s deal, which would have a 15 billion loan to Ukraine while also lowering gas prices by a third. Regardless of the EU deal being acknowledged by economists and German foreign ministers as “falling far short of what was needed to keep Ukraine competitive and bind it economically to Europe", Yanukovych’s decision to accept Russia’s deal in its stead prompted massive anti-government protests. Starting on the night of the 21st of November, these “Euromaidan” protests were led by supporters of the EU deal, who now further perceived the Russian-favoring Yanukovych as corrupt, autocratic, and a stooge of the Russians.
Yanukovych tried to quell the protest by sending the “berkut” internal security forces and passing a series of laws that severely restricted Ukrainians right to free speech, yet this further aggravated the protests and only made them worse.
Eventually, the Ukrainian parliament removed a lot of Yanukovych’s power and on February 22nd of 2014, with a margin of 380-0, voted to remove him due to “gross human rights violations and dereliction of duty.” These protests, which overthrew Yanukovych’s seat of power, occurred mostly in western Ukraine, which was more open to integration with the European Union. Crimea, which is on the eastern side of Ukraine, had fewer protests and tended to lean more sympathetic to Russia.
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine, however, continued to protest, believing that there was a coup that illegitimately deposed Yanukovych. These protests soon escalated, as pro-Russian groups urged the creation of militias to protect and clash against protestors supporting the national parliament’s decision. Five days after the parliament’s vote, on the 27th of February, armed men overtook key infrastructure builds and the parliament, forcing a supervised referendum that asked voters on deciding Crimean as a Russian subject. Many observers believe this was a faulty referendum given that the ruling party of Crimea, led by Anatoly Mogilyov, controlled 80 of the 100 seats in Parliament and were publicly opposed to the referendum being enacted in the first place. Nevertheless, it was successfully passed with 97% support and a high turnout of 83.1%.
After the referendum and with the local military bases held hostage in Crimea by “unknown forces, fully equipped” with “their faces covered,” the Ukrainian government became more assertive and ended its policy of restraint, thus allowing soldiers to use violence for self-defense. This decision followed announcements by the European Union and the United States in April to put sanctions on Putin’s close allies and key figures involved in the annexation. In short, they would be unable to spend and use assets like money and property in the EU and US. Those who break this would face secondary sanctions and other consequences. Despite its targeted nature, the general picture of political unpredictability between the West and Russia significantly hurt the Russian economy, but Russia continued its aggression, unbounded by threats.
Still retaining some of its hesitancy, the Ukrainian government initially funded so-called “Dnieper brigades” which, without direct orders from Kyiv, further polarized the situation by shooting pro-Russian activists, reinforcing the idea that Ukraine is sending violent killers to conquer back the east. This violence, along with other issues, escalated into a war in Donetsk and Luhansk in early April as the Ukrainian government besieged the cities and effectively drove the separatists out of the region. With Donetsk being an important cog in Ukraine’s steel industry, and Luhansk situated on the edge of the Russian border, Russia decided to send military equipment, along with a combination of disinformation tactics, material support, and Russian troops.
With Ukraine launching an effective counter-offensive operation, coming close to regaining control of all of the separatist land in Donbas (Donetsk and Luhansk). As the New York Times noted, loss to Ukraine would have been unacceptable because “a defeat of an insurgency in the heavily Russian eastern part of Ukraine[,…] would amount to a significant domestic political setback for President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia.” Therefore during August, Russia sent military personnel under the guise of “humanitarian convoy,” using significantly more powerful artillery and better equipped armored columns, regaining a lot of the territory that Ukraine captured previously. Two separate ceasefires, Minsk 1 and Minsk 2, were established but were repeatedly violated by both sides. With warlords fulfilling the power vacuum, Donbas has remained a conflict zone with little actual violence. However, the threat of conflict has risen in 2021 with increased troop deployments at the Russian border.
Nearly a million people have fled their homes since the fighting started in April, a month after Russia annexed Ukraine's southern Crimea peninsula. According to the BBC, “The violence in the east has continued despite a ceasefire deal struck in Minsk, Belarus, in September, with both sides accusing each other of shelling and other violations of the agreement.”
Crimea, on the other hand, while not suffering the same violence as Donbas, has also since changed from 2014. While Russia has funneled 10 billion into Crimea and has funded infrastructure projects, large sectors of the Crimean economy have been badly affected by Western sanctions and a decline in tourism. As Brookings noted, “It is probably fair to say that the reality of the economic situation today falls short of what many in Crimea expected, or hoped for, with Russia’s annexation.”
Since this initial conflict, Ukraine has elected president Volodymyr Zelensky, who presided over a single inexperienced party in parliament, with 61% new MPs and with 80% of all elected officials being inexperienced. An initial economic growth soon occurred largely attribute to a government rooted in fighting corruption and a strong central bank to restore faith in the hryvnia. However, a judicial system that is unwilling to grant citizens property rights and Ukraine’s strict regulation of its electricity sector has delayed investment and economic growth.
Despite his disastrous phone call with former president Trump, Zelensky has appeared to be a competent president, with the Atlantic council noting, “the country's macroeconomic stability appears strong, but few dare to invest in Ukraine. Without judicial reform or an increase in investment, there is little reason to expect any economic growth beyond the gains arising from the anticipated post-coronavirus rebound.”
Russia, on the other hand, has become emboldened by its involvement in Crimea, with its intervention in Syria, interference in the US election as prominent examples. Putin’s appeal to nationalism has succeeded in the short term, but his audacious maneuver has eliminated the possibility of western cooperation and investment. As observed by the Brookings Institution, “For the West, Russia’s seizure and annexation of Crimea pose a fundamental challenge to the European order and the norms established by the 1975 Helsinki Final Act.”, and this will likely continue for as long as Russia illegally occupies Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine.
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