Malabar: A Show of Strength in the Indo-Pacific

On 26th August 2021, the four nations comprising the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (henceforth the ‘Quad’)—viz India, Japan, the USA, and Australia—participated in the Malabar Exercise: a naval exercise off the coast of Guam in the Pacific Ocean.

The Malabar Exercise was first envisioned as a bilateral joint exercise between the navies of India and the United States, the first edition of which was conducted in 1992. Following two more exercises, the initiative was suspended for two years, as a result of India’s nuclear tests and the subsequent strain in Indo-US relations. The exercises were resumed from 2002 onwards, post which the Malabar Exercise has become an annual event. In 2007, the navies of Japan and Australia also participated for the first time, and from 2014 onwards, Japan became a regular participant.

credit: Business Standard

In 2020, for the first time in 13 years, all four members of the Quad once again jointly participated in the Malabar Exercise. The 2020 exercise had the express objective of collectively supporting a “free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific” and a “rules based international order”. The 2020 exercise was conducted in two phases, with the first in the Bay of Bengal and the second in the Arabian Sea.

As per the Indian Ministry of Defence, “MALABAR-21 would witness high-tempo exercises conducted between Destroyers’, Frigates, Corvettes, Submarines, Helicopters and Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft of the participating navies. Complex surface, sub-surface and air operations including Live Weapon Firing Drills, Anti-Surface, Anti-Air and Anti-Submarine Warfare Drills, Joint Manoeuvres and Tactical exercises will be conducted during the exercise.”

The 2021 Malabar Exercise is a follow-up to the 2020 edition, acting as a strong signal of the intent of the Quad partnership. Most analysts suggest that the recent invigoration of the Quad has been in response to the rising tensions between the group’s members with China. India in particular has reason to be concerned about its northern neighbour, given that the two Asian giants have been at a military standoff in the border region of Ladakh for over 15 months.

credit: Foreign Brief

Australia’s re-induction in Malabar in 2020 was a signal of the Quad’s rapid military mobilisation in the Indo-Pacific region, and the 2021 exercise further communicates this intent. Ostensibly, the objectives of the 2021 exercise are to “enhance inter-operability, gain from best practices and develop a common understanding of procedures for maritime security operations.” This highlights better naval military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific among the four strategic partners, which is likely to cause unease in Beijing. Furthermore, the common narrative of a “rules-based international order” and an “open, inclusive Indo-Pacific” is in line with the USA’s long-standing arguments contesting Chinese claims of sovereignty to the South China Sea, which is a major area of tension between the two powers.

While there is a tendency to compare the Quad to NATO, such an analogy may not be very accurate. The Quad is not a formal alliance like NATO, and it does not legally bind member states to the commitment of collective self-defence. At the same time, however, it provides a practical means of military cooperation among the four partners, and sends a strong message of intent and deterrence to the common adversary, which is China. The alignment of strategic interests and security threats has given India, Japan, the US, and Australia an impetus to effectively cooperate in the Indo-Pacific region, in order to counter China’s rising militarisation in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean. In the words of Rear Admiral (retired) Sudarshan Shrikhande of the Indian Navy, the Quad “must, among other things, contribute to being a key instrument of deterrence that is necessary keeping China in mind” and, while “the Quad need not be NATO in its formality, in its political congruence and as a post war response”, it can still be an effective deterrent.

Meanwhile, China views the Quad’s mobilisation and the Malabar Exercises as an indication of “US anxiety” with regards to China, and mostly dismisses the efficacy of a united Quad as part of a “US strategy” to “counterbalance” China, while not overlooking the potential threat of the Quad to Chinese interests. The Chinese narrative mostly revolves around a perceived decline in American conventional military capabilities in the region, and views the Quad as a last-resort defence mechanism of sorts.

Whether the Quad continues to expand and become a legitimate deterrent to a resurgent China will remain to be seen, while the recent Malabar Exercises seem to indicate the strong intent of the four partners to seriously push forward with this objective.